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MANDATORY DISCLOSURE IN PRIMARY MARKETS
Andrew A. Schwartz*
Mandatory disclosure—the idea that companies must be legally
required to disclose certain, specified information to public investors—is
the first principle of modern securities law. Despite the high costs it
imposes, mandatory disclosure has been well defended by legal scholars
on two theoretical grounds: ‘Agency costs’ and ‘information
underproduction.’ While these two concepts are a good fit for secondary
markets (where investors trade securities with one another), this Article
shows that they are largely irrelevant in the context of primary markets
(where companies offer securities directly to investors). The surprising
result is that primary offerings—such as an IPO—may not require
mandatory disclosure at all. This profound insight calls into question the
fundamental premises of the Securities Act of 1933 and similar laws
governing primary offerings around the world. Reform of these rules could
lead to a new age of simplified, low-cost primary offerings to the public,
something that is already happening in New Zealand through its equity
crowdfunding market.
I. INTRODUCTION
Mandatory disclosure—the idea that companies must be required by law to
disclose certain information to the investing public—is the foundation of modern
securities law, both for primary markets—where companies offer securities directly
to investors—and for secondary markets—where investors trade securities with one
another. Mandatory disclosure imposes significant costs—it costs millions of dollars
to produce the necessary disclosures for an IPO (initial public offering), not to
mention the ongoing costs of quarterly and annual reporting1—to the point that the
rule effectively excludes startups and small businesses from going public. Indeed,
the number of IPOs has sharply decreased in recent years for all businesses, with
*
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1
Andrew A. Schwartz, Crowdfunding Securities, 88 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1457, 1467–
70, n.57 (2013) (“the process of going public costs millions of dollars”).
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even billion-dollar private companies (so-called ‘unicorns’) expressly declining to
go public, in part due to the high and rising costs of mandatory disclosure, leading
some to question the wisdom of the practice.2
At the same time, opposition to mandatory disclosure has come from a small
but persistent group of legal scholars, including Roberta Romano and Paul
Mahoney, who challenge mandatory disclosure on theoretical grounds.3 These
scholars generally rely on law-and-economics ideas suggesting that market
incentives should be enough to induce companies to voluntarily provide investors
with an appropriate level of disclosure, rendering mandatory disclosure wasteful, or
at least unnecessary. For one thing, corporate promoters wishing to sell securities
for their full value have an incentive to provide fulsome disclosure about the
business; else potential investors will offer only a pittance per share. 4 For another,
intermediaries such as stock exchanges, being repeat players who need to keep their
customers (investors) for the long term, likewise have a financial interest in ensuring
sufficient disclosure from companies.5 As these scholars have shown, there are
powerful private incentives for voluntary disclosure in securities markets, presenting
a powerful challenge to the necessity of mandatory disclosure.
Rising to this challenge and responding on the very same law-and-economics
terms as the skeptics, Professor John Coffee and many other scholars developed a
sophisticated defense of mandatory disclosure that largely swept the field in the
1980s and remains the conventional wisdom to this day.6 According to this modern
2
A 2011 report approximated around 6,700 large corporations were being actively
traded at the time, and were responsible for a great portion of economic activity in the United
States. See HOWARD M. FRIEDMAN, PUBLICLY HELD CORPORATIONS: A LAWYER’S GUIDE 1
(2011). That number has decreased significantly for both regular companies and unicorn
billion dollar companies in recent years alongside falling IPO public offerings. See Eric
Shumpeter, Why the Decline in the Number of Listed American Firms Matters, ECONOMIST
(Apr. 22, 2017), https://www.economist.com/business/2017/04/22/why-the-decline-in-thenumber-of-listed-american-firms-matters [https://perma.cc/VYB3-JALF]; Jason M.
Thomas, Where Have All the Public Companies Gone?, WALL ST. J. (Nov. 16, 2017, 7:10
PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/where-have-all-the-public-companies-gone-15108691
25 [https://perma.cc/3CND-J3YT]; see also Andy Kessler, Unicorns Need IPOs, WALL ST.
J. (Jan. 7, 2018, 4:37 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/unicorns-need-ipos-1515361043
[https://perma.cc/K2PM-529D].
3
See, e.g., Roberta Romano, Empowering Investors: A Market Approach to Securities
Regulation, 107 YALE L.J. 2359, 2373–81 (1998); Paul G. Mahoney, The Exchange as
Regulator, 83 VA. L. REV. 1453, 1465–70 (1997) (advocating a competitive regulatory
approach to securities regulation).
4
FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF
CORPORATE LAW 256 (1991).
5
Mahoney, supra note 3, at 1459 (“Self-interested stock exchange members will
produce rules that investors want for the same reasons that self-interested bakers produce the
kind of bread that consumers want.”).
6
See generally John C. Coffee, Jr., Market Failure and the Economic Case for a
Mandatory Disclosure System, 70 VA. L. REV. 717 (1984).
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theory, mandatory disclosure is an efficient response to two economic issues that
market forces would not properly address on their own: (1) agency costs, and (2) the
underproduction of information.7
“Agency costs” is the idea that, left to their own devices, corporate managers
might pay themselves extravagantly, work as little as possible, or even steal from
the company, all to the detriment of investors.8 Under a regime of voluntary
disclosure, where managers of a corporation have free rein to decide what the
company will and will not disclose, they might decide to keep quiet about things that
paint them personally in a bad light, even if the information would be relevant to the
value of the company’s securities. Mandatory disclosure can solve this problem by
requiring companies to share information about managerial misbehavior even if it
leads the stock price to fall. Mandatory disclosure also deters bad behavior in the
first place, as managers can be expected to police their actions to avoid having to
provide embarrassing disclosures later.9
“Information underproduction” refers to the unlikelihood that companies will
voluntarily collect and disclose information that could be relevant to the value of
other firms, even if investors would prefer disclosure.10 To take but one example:
McDonald’s, which sells lots of soft drinks, presumably has information relevant to
consumer demand for Coke, including its rate of growth and how it compares with
competitors like Dr. Pepper and apple juice. This information on consumer demand
is useful and therefore valuable to Coca-Cola’s current and potential shareholders,
who are constantly trying to gauge consumer demand for Coke as a component of
their valuation of Coca-Cola stock. Unfortunately, McDonald’s has little financial
interest in tallying and reporting its Coke sales because doing so imposes some cost
on McDonald’s, but the benefit (of more accurate valuation) would flow to CocaCola and the market as a whole. Mandatory disclosure can remedy this problem by
7

Hence, they are sometimes called ‘market failures.’
See, e.g., EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 4, at 9–10; ADOLF A. BERLE, JR. &
GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY 6 (1932);
Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior,
Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305, 308 (1976).
9
Troy A. Paredes, Blinded by the Light: Information Overload and Its Consequences
for Securities Regulation, 81 WASH. U. L. Q. 417, 463 (2003) (“The argument is that
disclosure has a prophylactic effect by deterring corporate insiders from engaging in
fraudulent or corrupt behavior or mismanagement . . . .”). See generally 1 JEREMY BENTHAM,
PRINCIPLES OF PENAL LAW, in THE WORKS OF JEREMY J. Bentham 396, 402 (John Bowring
ed., 1962) (“When a man perceives or supposes pain to be the consequences of an act, he is
acted upon in such a manner as tends, with a certain force, to withdraw him, as it were, from
the commission of that act.”); A. A. Sommer, Jr., Therapeutic Disclosure, 4 SEC. REG. L.J.
263, 266–67 (1976) (“[I]f every instance of adultery had to be disclosed, there would
probably be less adultery.”).
10
Coffee, supra note 6, at 721–23 (discussing securities research as having similar
characteristics and problems that public goods have, the main example being
undercollection.).
8
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forcing all public companies to share certain types of information, thereby enhancing
the accuracy of all securities prices on the public trading market.11
Thanks to these two powerful ideas, the modern theory of mandatory disclosure
has achieved hegemony in the field. Nearly all scholars support the idea, both in the
United States and around the world.12 Only a very few academic “skeptics” continue
to hold out in favor of voluntary disclosure.13 Almost entirely overlooked in the
discussion, however, is the simple distinction between primary and secondary
markets. Understanding how mandatory disclosure operates differently in these two
markets provides potential ground for reconciliation among these competing
scholarly camps.
Secondary markets receive much more scholarly attention than do primary
markets, despite their names.14 Scholars’ focus on secondary trading rather than
primary offerings is understandable since many of the most important and
interesting issues in the field of securities law arise in that sphere. These issues
include insider trading, proxy contests, and hostile takeovers. When someone
mentions “the stock market” or “how the market is doing,” she likely means to refer
to the secondary market, not the primary one. Unfortunately, this focus on secondary
markets has led to a significant misunderstanding at the heart of modern securities
law and theory. This Article aims to correct that error.
Focusing primarily on the aforementioned concepts of agency costs and
information underproduction makes good sense in the context of secondary markets.
But if the field shifts its gaze to the primary context, these two ideas become largely
irrelevant, or so this Article shall claim.15
11

For another example, traders in Apple stock try to estimate the company’s iPhone
sales by reviewing disclosures made by other public companies that supply Apple with
screens or other iPhone components. See, e.g., Tripp Mickle, Apple Shares Sink After iPhone
Suppliers Lower Outlooks, WALL ST. J., (Nov. 12, 2018), https://www.wsj.com/articles/
apple-shares-sink-after-iphone-suppliers-lower-outlooks-1542061197 [https://perma.cc/XV
M8-PD4E] (“Apple Inc. shares sank [more than 5%] on Monday, as investors’ worries
deepened about sales of new iPhones after two key suppliers for the device cut their earnings
projections for coming months.”).
12
See infra Section I.B.
13
Brent J. Horton, In Defense of a Federally Mandated Disclosure System: Observing
Pre-Securities Act Prospectuses, 54 AM. BUS. L.J. 743, 745 (2017) (“[S]ome legal scholars
have questioned the Congressional finding that corporations failed to provide investors with
information; these scholars are referred to as ‘skeptics . . . .’”).
14
Insider trading alone, just one of the many features of the secondary market, attracts
more attention than IPOs, the key component of the primary market. To quantify this
phenomenon, consider that a September 7, 2019, search of Westlaw’s “Secondary Sources Law Reviews & Journals” database returned 563 law review articles with “insider trading”
in the title, but only 130 with “IPO” or “initial public offering” in the title.
15
See infra Part II. The canonical article in support of the modern theory hinted at
precisely this argument. Coffee, supra note 6, at 746 (noting that, while “the theory of
voluntary disclosure” was not persuasive with regard to “secondary market trading,” it “does
seem to have some validity as applied to initial public offerings and, to a lesser extent, to all
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As discussed in Part II below, neither agency costs nor information
underproduction holds much relevance in the primary context. Agency costs arise
only after a company has already sold its securities and investors worry that
management will begin to run the company in its own interest, rather than for the
benefit of shareholders. This concept is irrelevant to the primary market, where
promoters are trying to get investors to buy these securities at the outset, and thus
do not have additional shareholders to worry about just yet. In the primary market,
the board of directors, CEO, and other managers have not yet become agents,
because agency is established by the presence of shareholders. Because management
has not yet become an agent, there are no agency costs; they are a feature of the
secondary market alone.
Information underproduction occurs when one company may have relatively
easy access to information that would help participants in the secondary market more
accurately assess the value of some other company or companies whose securities
they trade. Information underproduction has almost nothing to do with primary
offerings, because new issuers rarely have the same quantity or quality of relevant
market information as existing public companies, and because a primary offering is
merely a one-time event. Furthermore, promoters have powerful economic interests
to divulge all the information that investors want. Thus, the public can likely view
almost all relevant company information.16
This Article poses a direct theoretical challenge to the dominant view that
mandatory disclosure—and all its attendant costs—is justified in the context of
primary offerings. Contradicting the guiding principle of the Securities Act of 1933,
it suggests that primary offerings—especially those not followed by secondary
trading—may not actually require mandatory disclosure at all. This Article’s novel
distinction between primary and secondary markets thus provides theoretical
support for a legal reform that would allow companies to make simple, low-cost
primary offerings to the public.
Indeed, this is not only a theoretical possibility but a real one—at least in New
Zealand. This small country, whose economy, population, and landmass is roughly
comparable to one of the several states17 and whose securities laws tend to mirror
primary distributions”).
16
That said, the concept of information underproduction (unlike agency costs) is not
totally irrelevant in the primary context. It is possible that the information provided in a
primary offering could help traders value other securities already quoted on the secondary
market. For instance, certain initial disclosures provided by electric-car maker Tesla at the
time of its IPO probably were relevant to traders trying to value other car companies like
Ford or GM, whose stock was already traded in the secondary market. In most instances,
however, information production is of little practical importance in the context of primary
issuance. See discussion infra Section II.A.2, and accompanying notes 108–113.
17
Colorado and New Zealand both have about five million residents, similar size
economies, and almost the exact same land mass. QuickFacts Colorado, U.S. CENSUS
BUREAU, https://www.census.gov/quickfacts/CO [https://perma.cc/8GM3-UN5N] (last
visited Sept. 18, 2019); CIA, The World Factbook Australia – Oceania: New Zealand,
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our own,18 was one of the first in the world to establish a legal framework for “equity
crowdfunding.”19 This new form of internet-based public stock market is solely a
primary market with no secondary trading.20 This Article hypothesizes that a
primary-only market such as this could succeed entirely based on voluntary
disclosure. New Zealand put this claim to the test.
New Zealand’s equity crowdfunding law, passed in 2013 and put into effect the
following year, took the seemingly radical step of eliminating mandatory
disclosure.21 What to disclose is a voluntary decision made by the company issuing
shares and the platform on which it lists its offering. By comparison, the
crowdfunding law in the United States, enacted in 2012, is much more traditional
because it imposes a set of specified mandatory disclosures.22 The United States has
thus premised crowdfunding on the modern theory of mandatory disclosure (even
though that theory does not fit a primary-only market). By contrast, crowdfunding
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/nz.html [https://perma.cc
/3QWU-2H8B] (last updated Sept. 18, 2019).
18
See Andrew A. Schwartz, The Gatekeepers of Crowdfunding, 75 WASH. & LEE L.
REV. 885, 917–18 (2018) [hereinafter Schwartz, Gatekeepers].
19
Id. at 919–21 (describing New Zealand’s Financial Markets Conduct Act 2013 and
regulations issued thereunder).
20
This is not due to a legal restriction but rather a business decision by New Zealand’s
equity crowdfunding platforms not to organize a secondary market. See Sophie Boot,
Investors Not Yet Ready for Secondary Market in Crowd-Funded Equities, Platforms Say,
SCOOP (NZ) (July 12, 2017, 8:50 PM), http://www.scoop.co.nz/stories/BU1707/S00307/
correct-investors-not-yet-ready-for-secondary-market.htm
[https://perma.cc/4GWWARTN] (“Platforms with existing crowdfunding licences would need to apply to the FMA in
order to operate a secondary market, but none have yet done so.”); Nikki Mandow, Snowball
Effect Looks at Launching Secondary Market, SCOOP (NZ) (May 9, 2018, 4:16 PM),
http://www.scoop.co.nz/stories/BU1805/S00282/snowball-effect-looks-at-launching-secon
dary-market.htm [https://perma.cc/YHK6-FQZZ] (reporting that one platform is “looking at
launching a secondary market,” but has yet to do so). One platform in the UK does operate
a secondary market, but that appears to be the lone exception worldwide. Mandow, supra
(“UK-based equity crowdfunding platform Seedrs launched a secondary market in June
[2017]. Its model involves opening its market on the first Tuesday of every month and
closing it a week later.”).
21
Financial Markets Conduct Act 2013, sch 1, s 6(1)(a) (N.Z.) (“An offer of financial
products to a person (A) does not require disclosure under Part 3 of this Act if the offer is
through a licensed intermediary in the course of supplying prescribed intermediary services
to (A).”); Financial Markets Conduct Regulations 2014, s 184(a) (N.Z.) (defining equity
crowdfunding as a “prescribed intermediary service . . . .”).
22
15 U.S.C. § 77d-1(b)(1)(A)-(I) (2012) (mandating various disclosures and
authorizing the SEC to add to the list “such other information as the Commission may, by
rule, prescribe, for the protection of investors and in the public interest . . .”); see also Joan
MacLeod Heminway, How Congress Killed Investment Crowdfunding: A Tale of Political
Pressure, Hasty Decisions, and Inexpert Judgments that Begs for a Happy Ending, 102 KY.
L.J. 865, 869 (2014) (“Congress employed traditional tools of securities regulation in
composing the [JOBS] Act . . . ,” including “mandatory disclosure rules . . . .”).
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in New Zealand is premised on this Article’s thesis that a primary-only securities
market may not need mandatory disclosure. Instead, this market could thrive solely
based on voluntary disclosure. So, how are these markets performing?
This Article’s author spent six months on the ground in New Zealand to study
the country’s crowdfunding law and marketplace. He conducted local qualitative
research by interviewing entrepreneurs, platform operators, investors, lawyers,
academics, and government officials (including the Minister of Commerce) about
the subject. In addition, he conducted quantitative research by gathering publicly
available data on equity crowdfunding in the United States, New Zealand, and other
countries.23
Using this research, this Article’s author provides an empirical report below
that is consistent with the basic thesis of this Article. With the caveat that the United
States is still in the early days and therefore should be cautious about drawing strong
conclusions, New Zealand’s equity crowdfunding market—a primary public stock
market without mandatory disclosure—has indeed found financial success.
Additionally, this market has greatly outshined that of the United States without any
reported fraud. Scaled for the size of its economy and focusing on the first year in
each jurisdiction, companies in New Zealand have conducted thirteen times as many
crowdfunding campaigns and raised thirty times as much capital as their
counterparts in the United States, with a much higher success rate (80% vs. 50%).24
Furthermore, evidence from other jurisdictions shows that New Zealand has not only
outshone the United States but has also become a worldwide leader in the field.25
The outsized success of New Zealand’s liberal crowdfunding regime compared
with that of the United States, along with the fact that fraud (or even business failure)
is practically non-existent there, is consistent with this Article’s claim. To reiterate,
this Article claims that a primary stock market open to the public does not need—
and in fact may be better off without—mandatory disclosure. Rather than
government regulation, New Zealand’s crowdfunding market relies upon private
methods of governance such as gatekeeping and syndication, both of which this
Article describes below.
The structure of this Article is as follows: Part I introduces the modern theory
of mandatory disclosure and its foundations based on agency costs and information
underproduction; Part II presents the Article’s core theoretical contribution and
claims that the modern theory of mandatory disclosure is generally inapplicable to

23

Other aspects of this research are reported and discussed in other papers. See, e.g.,
Andrew A. Schwartz, Social Enterprise Crowdfunding in New Zealand, in THE CAMBRIDGE
HANDBOOK OF SOCIAL ENTERPRISE LAW (Joseph Yockey & Benjamin Means eds., 2018);
Schwartz, Gatekeepers, supra note 18, at 885 (2018); Andrew A. Schwartz, Equity
Crowdfunding in New Zealand, 2018 N.Z. L. REV. 243; [hereinafter Schwartz, Equity
Crowdfunding in New Zealand].
24
Schwartz, Equity Crowdfunding in New Zealand, supra note 23, at 250–52.
25
Id. at 253.
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primary offerings, with the result that a primary market can succeed without
mandatory disclosure; Part III presents empirical evidence from New Zealand’s
equity crowdfunding market that is consistent with the claim. A short Conclusion
summarizes the argument.
II. THE MODERN THEORY OF MANDATORY DISCLOSURE
At least since the New Deal of the 1930s, the overwhelming consensus in the
field of securities law has been that public securities markets (like the New York
Stock Exchange) cannot regulate themselves.26 Rather, because of their importance
and potential danger, scholars generally agree that public securities markets must be
carefully and comprehensively regulated.27 This regulation is accomplished
primarily through mandatory disclosure, both for primary offerings made to the
public and for secondary trading markets open to the public.28
Mandatory disclosure imposes such significant costs that it deters many
companies, especially small ones, from conducting an IPO in the first place.29 Even
so, nearly all scholars and policymakers support the policy based on what this Article
refers to as the modern theory of mandatory disclosure.30 This modern theory holds
that economic forces will be insufficient to generate an optimal level of disclosure
for public investors because of two market failures: agency costs and information
underproduction. Thus, this modern theory posits that the law can solve these
problems through mandatory disclosure.31

26
STEPHEN J. CHOI & A.C. PRITCHARD, ESSENTIALS: SECURITIES REGULATION 1 (2008)
(“Generally, in a market economy, people are left to their own devices when deciding how
to allocate their funds. If you want to use your money to buy a vacation or a fancy new car,
the legal system will not stand in your way. . . . For securities, however, a dedicated federal
agency, [the] SEC, enforces a broad array of federal statutes and regulations.”).
27
Id. at 4.
28
Mahoney, supra note 3, at 1465 (“The most prominent feature of securities regulation
in the United States is the mandatory disclosure system.”).
29
See, e.g., Jeff Schwartz, The Twilight of Equity Liquidity, 34 CARDOZO L. REV. 531,
546 (2012) (“Representatives of smaller companies have complained repeatedly to Congress
and the SEC about escalating costs and surveys indicate that compliance obligations are
among the biggest concerns entrepreneurial firms have with going public. While it seems
that companies gripe about the costs of compliance no matter the regulatory regime, in this
case the concerns appear credible.”).
30
Kevin S. Haeberle & M. Todd Henderson, Making a Market for Corporate
Disclosure, 35 YALE J. REG. 383, 390 (2018) (“The consensus story in the securities-law
literature is that market forces alone are insufficient to bring about sufficient amounts of
public-company disclosure.”).
31
Id. at 383 (“It has long been said that market forces alone will result in a problematic
under-sharing of information by public companies.”).
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A. Mandatory Disclosure and Its Costs
Centuries ago, stock markets were small, private clubs where the members
knew and dealt with one another on a regular and repeated basis.32 The members
also had a clear economic incentive to protect investors, since their livelihoods
depended on their clients coming back to trade again in the future (and they would
only do so if they felt they were treated fairly).33 An entrepreneur seeking to finance
a venture was a one-time player and in a position to mislead investors and then take
the money and run. Yet the members of the exchange, as repeat players, were not
willing to sacrifice the trust which investors placed in them. Under such conditions,
club members came together and established a set of private rules, as well as private
methods of enforcement (such as stripping violators of their membership), that
proved fairly effective at preventing fraud and market abuse by entrepreneurs and
other one-time players.34 Legal regulation of securities was apparently not needed.35
By the twentieth century, however, things had changed. Stock exchanges were
opened up to the public, and millions of ordinary Americans bought and sold stock
through brokers at the New York Stock Exchange and similar venues, making self32

EDWARD PETER STRINGHAM, PRIVATE GOVERNANCE: CREATING ORDER IN
ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL LIFE 21–26 (2015) (discussing the theory of ‘club goods’); id. at 3
(“Without the ability to rely on external courts, [stock] brokers transformed coffeehouses
into private clubs that created and enforced rules. Each club aimed to admit only reputable
brokers, and those who broke the rules would be kicked out and labelled a ‘lame duck.’ The
private club known as Jonathan’s Coffeehouse eventually became the London Stock
Exchange . . . .”).
33
Id. at 72 (“Fraud harms victims and diminishes future trade. London stockbrokers
saw this problem and recognized that they could benefit by mitigating it.”); Frank H.
Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Mandatory Disclosure and the Protection of Investors, 70
VA. L. REV. 669, 690 (1984) [hereinafter Easterbrook & Fischel, Protection of Investors]
(“Exchanges gain . . . by adopting rules that minimize the amount of deceit committed by
listed firms, because investors who are misled are less likely to be repeat players.”);
Mahoney, supra note 3, at 1457 (“Exchanges should have strong incentives to adopt rules
that benefit investors. I will not belabour the arguments because they are the same ones that
apply to the incentives of any producer to supply goods or services that consumers
desire . . . .”).
34
STRINGHAM, supra note 32, at 61–76; cf. Andrew A. Schwartz, The Perpetual
Corporation, 80 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 764, 798–99 (2012) (explaining that when parties
anticipate repeated future interactions, “the optimal move is always to cooperate” and
discussing the ‘prisoners dilemma’) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
35
Mahoney, supra note 3, at 1457 (“Stock markets, meaning organized markets in
which professional, specialized intermediaries trade securities pursuant to a common set of
rules, have existed since the seventeenth century. Governments paid attention to, and tried
to restrict the activities of, these markets from the outset, but for most exchanges,
comprehensive governmental regulation of rules and procedures is a twentieth-century
phenomenon. For most of their history, then, exchanges have been the primary regulators of
securities markets.”).
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regulation infeasible.36 With stock trading now open to the public, the state and then
federal governments began to impose mandatory regulations on the practice to
protect investors. This imposition began in the 1910s when numerous state
governments, led by Kansas and other states far from Wall Street, passed so-called
“Blue Sky” laws.37 These statutes required that sellers of securities file their
securities with state authorities and have them approved prior to making any offers
to state residents, thereby requiring state government regulators to provide a
substantive “merit” review of every security for sale in the state. These merit reviews
not only revealed information about the company but also determined whether the
offering was fair for the buyer.
A few decades later—shortly after the devastating stock market crash of 1929
and amid of the Great Depression—the federal government enacted the Securities
Act of 1933 (the ‘Securities Act’) and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.38 These
sweeping statutes gave birth to the Securities Exchange Commission (“SEC”) and
imposed intense regulation and oversight on public securities markets.39 The core
feature of this federal regulatory regime was, and remains, mandatory disclosure.
This feature represents a legal requirement that companies selling stock or other
securities provide specified information to the SEC and the public.40 In contrast with
the Blue Sky laws, the federal system of mandatory disclosure did not call for merit
review.41 Rather, the goal was simply to give investors the relevant information
about a company and let them make their own decision whether to invest.42

36

NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE, AMERICAN STOCK E XCHANGE, HISTORICAL
TIMELINE, https://www.nyse.com/publicdocs/American_Stock_Exchange_Historical_Time
line.pdf [https://perma.cc/QW68-H4L3].
37
See generally Rick A. Fleming, 100 Years of Securities Law: Examining a
Foundation Laid in the Kansas Blue Sky, 50 WASHBURN L.J. 583 (2011).
38
LOUIS LOSS ET AL., FUNDAMENTALS OF SECURITIES REGULATION 47–65 (7th ed.
2018) (recounting the history and purpose of the Acts).
39
Id.
40
Id. at 50–54; Elisabeth de Fontenay, Do the Securities Laws Matter? The Rise of the
Leveraged Loan Market, 39 J. CORP. L. 725, 726 (2014) (opining that mandatory disclosure
is the “crown jewel and major innovation” of federal securities regulation.); Allen Ferrell,
Mandatory Disclosure and Stock Returns: Evidence from the Over-the-Counter Market, 36
J. LEGAL STUD. 213 (2007) (“Mandatory disclosure requirements placed on publicly traded
firms constitute the core of U.S. securities regulation.”); Mahoney, supra note 3, at 1465
(“The most prominent feature of securities regulation in the United States is the mandatory
disclosure system.”).
41
LOSS ET AL., supra note 38, at 50–53 (describing the “battle of the philosophies”—
merit review versus mandatory disclosure—and noting that, in the end, “President Roosevelt
chose the disclosure philosophy.”).
42
It is certainly true that many “ordinary” investors lack the time and expertise to
actually read and understand securities disclosures. Even so, they can rely on summaries and
reports from ‘Wall Street’ analysts who essentially translate the specialized language used
in securities filings into plain English.
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Under the Securities Act, a company seeking to sell securities to the public in
a primary offering (often called an Initial Public Offering (IPO)) must first ‘register’
those securities with the SEC.43 This registration process includes filing a massive
disclosure statement with the SEC that details information such as bonus and profitsharing agreements and financial statements from prior years.44
All this work can consume over 1,200 hours45 and can take over six months to
complete, even “under ideal conditions.”46 In addition to the direct cost of preparing
this statement, companies incur the cost of distracted executives.47 Moreover,
companies are usually unable to fulfill these disclosure requirements entirely on
their own. This inability forces companies to add the expense of external attorneys,
accountants, and underwriters.48 Generally, these additions add around 10% of the
total offering amount to the price tag of an IPO.49 Then, after companies prepare a
registration statement, they must wait for the SEC to review and comment on the
statement draft. Because this process can take months, the price at which a company
anticipated issuing its securities may have changed due to fluctuating financial or
economic conditions, adding even more cost to the process.50
Unfortunately, these burdens tend to fall most heavily on the companies who
can afford them the least—small businesses with small offerings—because the costs
of filing are not proportionate to the size of the offering.51 As the costs of providing
disclosure reach millions of dollars, disclosure becomes totally infeasible for
startups and small businesses who have less capital to spend. Thus, the pragmatic
response for some small companies is to seek an exemption from the registration
requirements altogether.52
As the demands of mandatory disclosure have increased in recent years, in part
because of the federal Sarbanes-Oxley53 and Dodd-Frank Acts,54 the United States
43

15 U.S.C. § 77e(a)(1) (2012); LOSS ET AL., supra note 38, at 62.
See 17 C.F.R. § 229 (2018) (providing instructions for filing registration statement).
45
Schwartz, supra note 1, at 1469.
46
Stuart R. Cohn & Gregory C. Yadley, Capital Offense: The SEC’s Continuing
Failure to Address Small Business Financing Concerns, 4 N.Y.U. J. L. & BUS. 1, 8 (2007).
47
Schwartz, supra note 1, at 1469.
48
Cohn & Yadley, supra note 46, at 9.
49
Id. at 8 (“While a self-underwritten offering will cost less and, theoretically, can be
completed in less time, results have not been positive for many non-underwritten
offerings.”).
50
Id. at 8.
51
Schwartz, supra note 1, at 1470.
52
See generally Cohn & Yadley, supra note 46, at 12 (noting the numerous hurdles to
qualifying for an exemption, including the fact that “[t]he private offering exemptions,
Section 4(2) and Rule 506, impose ‘sophistication’ and ‘experience’ eligibility standards that
substantially limit a small company’s pool of potential investors”).
53
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (2002) (codified in
scattered sections of 11 U.S.C., 15 U.S.C., 18 U.S.C., and 28 U.S.C.).
54
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010, Pub. L. No.
111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (codified in scattered sections of 5 U.S.C., 7 U.S.C., 12
44
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has seen a sharp decline in IPOs: an average of over 300 IPOs per year between 1996
and 2006. Since then, the country has seen an average of about 125 per year.55
Because companies tend to hire most after they go public,56 this decline impacts not
only the investing public, but also the working public. Though unfortunate in and of
itself, this decline also has ramifications for the broader U.S. economy. As the
American primary markets become less attractive to U.S. companies, they may
choose to take their IPOs elsewhere, looking instead to markets in the United
Kingdom or China.57
Despite these concerns, this basic framework of federal securities regulation,
with its focus on costly mandatory disclosure, has remained in place for nearly a
century.58 During that time, the federal government has repeatedly demonstrated its
continued faith in mandatory disclosure by expanding its scope and coverage. 59 The
result is that the cost of providing all the mandatory disclosures in an IPO can run to
several million dollars.60 Despite this great expense, modern securities practitioners,
regulators, and scholars overwhelmingly agree that mandatory disclosures are worth
the cost.61 This broad consensus is premised on what this Article refers to as the
U.S.C., 15 U.S.C., 22 U.S.C., 26 U.S.C., 28 U.S.C.).
55
See 2017 IPO Report, WILMERHALE 2 (2017), https://www.wilmerhale.com//media/fc4be2dd82d04a42ad7807f5e024d304.pdf [https://perma.cc/2DE5-URRM].
56
H.R. REP. NO. 112-406, at 7 (2012).
57
Id. It bears noting that 2019 may herald a new wave of significant IPO activity. See
Maureen Farrell & Corrie Driebusch, IPO-Hungry Investors Look to Have Their Moment in
2019, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 31, 2018), https://www.wsj.com/articles/ipo-hungry-investorslook-to-have-their-moment-in-2019-11546189200 [https://perma.cc/3FU2-V6TD].
58
Joan MacLeod Heminway, Personal Facts About Executive Officers: A Proposal for
Tailored Disclosures to Encourage Reasonable Investor Behavior, 42 WAKE FOREST L. REV.
749, 752 (2007).
59
See LOSS ET AL., supra note 38, at 7–11 (describing “the recurrent theme” of federal
securities legislation as “disclosure, again disclosure, and still more disclosure”).
60
Schwartz, supra note 1, at 1464.
61
See Elisabeth de Fontenay, The Deregulation of Private Capital and the Decline of
the Public Company, 68 HASTINGS L.J. 445, 473 (2017) (“For several decades now the
majority view has been that, in theory, the cost-benefit analysis of mandatory disclosure in
federal securities regulation is a favorable one . . . .”) [hereinafter de Fontenay, Deregulation
of Private Capital]; see also de Fontenay, supra note 40, at 759 (2014) (referring to “the
orthodoxy of mandatory disclosure . . . ”); Li-Wen Lin, Corporate Social and Environmental
Disclosure in Emerging Securities Markets, 35 N.C. J. INT’L L. & COM. REG. 1, 2 (2009)
(stating “disclosure is the orthodox focus of securities law”); Donald C. Langevoort, The
SEC as a Lawmaker: Choices About Investor Protection in the Face of Uncertainty, 84
WASH. U. L. REV. 1591, 1617–18 (2006) (stating “orthodox securities regulation rests [on
the idea] that investors take advantage of the disclosures that SEC requirements generate”);
Robert Prentice, Whither Securities Regulation? Some Behavioral Observations Regarding
Proposals for Its Future, 51 DUKE L.J. 1397, 1400 (2002) (discussing “the developing
consensus that American securities regulation is the optimal system for governing capital
markets”); Merritt B. Fox, Retaining Mandatory Securities Disclosure: Why Issuer Choice
Is Not Investor Empowerment, 85 VA. L. REV. 1335, 1339 (1999) (reporting on a “rough
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“modern theory” of mandatory disclosure, the substance of which shall be examined
in the next Section.
B. Debate over Disclosure and the Two Theoretical Bases for the Modern Theory
Scholars in the field widely agree that company disclosure provides numerous
important benefits for investors, other companies, and the public at large,62 but
disagree whether this disclosure should be mandated, or whether it can be
accomplished voluntarily. Though the modern theory of mandatory disclosure still
prevails, several compelling arguments for voluntary disclosure have been made.
In the 1930s, when the federal securities laws were new, the driving rationale
for mandatory disclosure was to treat “mom and pop” investors fairly by providing
them with accurate and timely information about potential and actual investments.63
But anyone who has actually looked at a securities filing in the primary market
knows that these filings are so arcane and densely written as to be almost completely
impenetrable to an ordinary retail investor. Rather, retail investors benefit from
professional securities analysts who actually do read and trade based on such filings,
and thereby drive market prices to incorporate the information contained in the

consensus” in favor of mandatory disclosure and noting that “even most economics-oriented
legal academics” agree); id. at 1340 (discussing the “prevailing consensus for retaining
mandatory disclosure”).
62
See de Fontenay, supra note 40, at 733–34 (cataloging the “possible benefits” of
securities regulation as “preventing unsophisticated investors from making risky
investments, ensuring that investors are adequately informed before making risky
investments, improving the allocational efficiency of capital markets, preventing fraud by
issuers and intermediaries, correcting inefficiencies in the production of material investment
information, standardizing disclosure practices among issuers, controlling specific
managerial or promoter agency problems, and helping established firms create barriers to
entry for new firms”) (citations omitted); see also Joel Seligman, The Historical Need for a
Mandatory Corporate Disclosure System, 9 J. CORP. L. 1, 9 (1983) (“Historically, the
proponents of the SEC’s mandatory corporate disclosure system have advanced five
principal arguments to justify the system. First, in the absence of a compulsory corporate
disclosure system some issuers will conceal or misrepresent information material to
investment decisions. Second, in the absence of a compulsory corporate disclosure system,
underwriting costs and insiders’ salaries and perquisites will be excessive. Third, in the
absence of a mandatory corporate disclosure system, there will be less ‘public confidence’
in the markets. Fourth, in the absence of the laws creating a mandatory corporate disclosure
system, neither state laws nor private associations such as the New York Stock Exchange
can ensure the optimal level of corporate disclosure. Fifth, in the absence of a mandatory
corporate disclosure system, civil or criminal actions will not ensure optimal levels of
corporate disclosure.”).
63
de Fontenay, Deregulation of Private Capital, supra note 61, at 474 (“A moment’s
thought makes it clear that passive, dispersed investors require substantial amounts of
information from issuers in order to have any hope of valuing their investment . . . .”).
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filing.64 Hence, over time, the “fairness rationale” for mandatory disclosure has been
“almost universally discarded” among scholars and policymakers.65
Similarly, no one seriously argues that large public companies would decline
to provide information to the public absent legally mandated disclosure.66 This lack
of argument is generally based on the concept of “signaling,” which suggests that
companies have an incentive to disclose even bad news. This incentive exists
because, if companies stay silent, investors will presume that things are even worse.
Accordingly, a company seeking to raise money from the public has a clear
economic incentive to disclose all information relevant to potential investors,
regardless of whether such disclosure is mandated by law.67 Potential investors will
presume a company that discloses nothing has something to hide (such as poor
business performance). Thus, a company that is doing well (or even just fine) has an
incentive to voluntarily disclose relevant information to distinguish itself from those
poor prospects that remain silent.68
64

EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 4, at 293–94.
Luca Enriques & Sergio Gilotta, Disclosure and Financial Market Regulation, in
THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF FINANCIAL REGULATION 514 (Niamh Moloney, et al., eds.
2015) (“The fairness rationale has been almost universally discarded. Today, nobody
seriously argues that protecting investors via disclosure is a proper policy just because doing
so is . . . just.”); Easterbrook & Fischel, Protection of Investors, supra note 33, at 692–93
(“The justification most commonly offered for mandatory disclosure rules is that they are
necessary to ‘preserve confidence’ in the capital markets. It is said that investors, especially
small and unsophisticated ones, withdraw their capital to the detriment of the markets and
the economy as a whole when they fear that they may be exploited by the firms or betterinformed traders. Disclosure rules both deter fraud and equalize ‘access’ to information,
restoring the necessary confidence. . . . [This argument is not persuasive;] after fifty years,
the proponents of regulation have no scientifically-acceptable evidence of a favorable costbenefit ratio for any disclosure rule that rests on the benefits of reducing fraud or increasing
confidence.”).
66
EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 4, at 288 (“Firms have been disclosing
important facts about themselves . . . as long as there have been firms.”).
67
See Stephen A. Ross, Disclosure Regulation in Financial Markets: Implications of
Modern Finance Theory and Signaling Theory, in ISSUES IN FINANCIAL REGULATION 177,
184–85 (Franklin R. Edwards ed., 1979) (“[I]n a competitive market (with no mandated
disclosure) the managers of firms . . . will have a strong self-interest in disclosing relevant
information.”).
68
EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 4, at 288–89; Easterbrook & Fischel,
Protection of Investors, supra note 33, at 683 (“[T]ake a simple example of a firm that wants
to issue new securities. The firm has a project (say, the manufacture of a new computer) that
it expects to be profitable. If the firm simply asked for money without disclosing the project
and managers involved, however, it would get nothing. Investors would assume the worst,
because, they would reason that if the firm had anything good to say for itself it would do
so. Silence means bad news. A firm with a good project, seeking to distinguish itself from a
firm with a mediocre project (or no project at all), would disclose the optimal amount of
information. That is, it would disclose more and more so long as the cost of disclosure (both
direct costs of dissemination and indirect costs of giving information to rivals) was
65
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As Easterbrook and Fischel, among others, have explained, disclosure is so
valuable to both the public and public companies that law need not command it.69
Therefore, we should expect it to come voluntarily. The upshot of this “voluntary
disclosure” theory is that any sort of mandated disclosure that goes beyond what
companies would voluntarily provide would be superfluous and wasteful.70
Beyond the company itself, a private stock exchange likewise has powerful
economic incentives to regulate its securities market in a way that will protect and
benefit investors, a point championed by John Mahoney.71 The way that an exchange
makes money is by listing companies and having investors buy in or trade with one
another, as each transaction generates a return for the exchange.72 Since revenues
rise as the volume of transaction rises, an exchange has a financial incentive to attract
investors. As a result, exchanges have an interest in ensuring that investors feel wellprotected and sufficiently informed when they trade on the exchange.73 Under this
theory, it would harm investors for the government to impose any additional
disclosure obligations, because they cost more to produce and disseminate than they
are worth to investors.74
Additionally, an exchange could impose strict listing standards to protect
investors, rather than listing any company that asks. An exchange could also
discipline brokers who take advantage of investors by expelling them from the
exchange (and thus impacting their livelihood).75 And even if individual companies
worthwhile to investors as a whole.”); Romano, supra note 3, at 2374 (“Because firms need
capital and investors need information, firms have powerful incentives to disclose
information if they are to compete successfully for funds against alternative investment
opportunities.”).
69
EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 4, at 288–89 (“If disclosure is worthwhile to
investors, the firm can profit by providing it. . . . [For this reason, [f]irms have been disclosing
important facts about themselves . . . as long as there have been firms.”).
70
de Fontenay, Deregulation of Private Capital, supra note 61, at 476 (“In this view,
mandating disclosure either leads to a surfeit of information that investors do not actually
want—with heavy costs on the companies that generate it—or stifles innovation and
improvements in disclosure.”); Seligman, supra note 62, at 5 n.24 (“In theory, it can be
argued that a mandatory corporate disclosure system is unnecessary because corporate
managers possess sufficient incentives to voluntarily disclose all or virtually all information
material to investors.”).
71
Mahoney, supra note 3, at 1453.
72
EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 4, at 294–95 (“[T]he success of an exchange
depends on the amount of trading.”).
73
Id. (“[E]xchanges have incentives to adopt rules governing trade that operate to the
benefit of investors.”); Mahoney, supra note 3, at 1459 (“Self-interested stock exchange
members will produce rules that investors want for the same reasons that self-interested
bakers produce the kind of bread that consumers want.”).
74
STRINGHAM, supra note 32, at 195–200; Mahoney, supra note 3, at 1500
(“Exchanges have strong incentives to provide rules of market structure that investors want
and to compel adherence by their members to contractual and fiduciary obligations.”).
75
STRINGHAM, supra note 32, at 30–33.
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face a collective action problem that would prevent them from providing efficient
levels of disclosure, an exchange can solve that problem by requiring all listed
companies to make certain specified disclosures.76 Indeed, stock exchanges
performed all of these functions from the 1600s to the present day.77 Moreover,
given their economic incentives and deep knowledge of market conditions,
exchanges may do a better job regulating securities markets than government
officials.78 Similar arguments could apply to professional underwriters and
investment banks, as well as any other intermediaries that bridge the divide between
companies and the public.
Based on these theories, a few dissenters have challenged the modern theory in
support of mandatory disclosure and spoken out in favor of voluntary disclosure.
Among the most notable of these dissenters are Professors Roberta Romano, Paul
Mahoney, Alan Palmiter, Stephen Choi, and Andrew Guzman. All of these
professors have published articles questioning the soundness of the arguments in
favor of mandatory disclosure and other aspects of modern securities regulation.79
Even so, the consensus in favor of mandatory disclosure remains as strong as
ever. This strength is unrelated to any empirical findings in support of mandatory
disclosure, as the empirical evidence, although voluminous, is ultimately
inconclusive.80 Rather, modern scholars’ support for legally mandated disclosure
76

EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 4, at 294–95 (“Organized exchanges offer the
firms a way to cope with the collective action problem.”).
77
See generally STRINGHAM, supra note 32; see also Mahoney, supra note 3, at 1459–
62; NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE LISTED COMPANY MANUAL § 2 (section on “Disclosure
and Reporting Material Information”).
78
Mahoney, supra note 3, at 1462 (“[A] governmental regulator that sets out to
determine optimal exchange rules starts from a substantial disadvantage in information,
experience, and incentives compared to an exchange.”).
79
See generally Romano, supra note 3, at 2359; Stephen J. Choi & Andrew T. Guzman,
Portable Reciprocity: Rethinking the International Reach of Securities Regulation, 71 S.
CAL. L. REV. 903 (1998).
80
Fox, supra note 61, at 1394 (stating that “empirical studies have not resolved the
issue one way or the other . . .”). Some empirical studies suggest that companies would
voluntarily disclose all the information the market would want without legal compulsion.
See, e.g., de Fontenay, supra note 40, at 728–29 (detailing empirical study concluding that
“the securities laws are not achieving their principal goal” of “remedying the
underproduction of material investment information” in “today’s debt markets” because,
“[p]urely through private ordering, the loan market appears to be providing sufficient
information for investors . . .”); Romano, supra note 3, at 2373; George J. Benston, Required
Disclosure and the Stock Market: An Evaluation of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 63
AM. ECON. REV. 132, 144–45 (1973) (empirical analysis of stock prices before and after the
passage of the 1930s federal securities laws finding no significant effect from the new
mandated disclosure—suggesting that companies were already voluntarily providing all the
information that the market desired). Other empirical studies lend support to the consensus
view that mandatory disclosure is needed, beneficial and efficient. See, e.g., REINIER
KRAAKMAN ET AL., THE ANATOMY OF CORPORATE LAW: A COMPARATIVE AND FUNCTIONAL
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rests primarily on theory. Specifically, this theory includes two ideas that sound in
law-and-economics: (1) opportunism resulting in agency costs, and (2) inaccurate
pricing caused by information underproduction.81
1. Agency Costs
First, the separation of ownership and control that is so essential to the corporate
form82 also creates agency costs and the risk of opportunistic behavior by corporate
management.83 The idea here, at its most basic, is that those who manage a
APPROACH 279 (2d ed. 2009) [hereinafter KRAAKMAN (2009)] (acknowledging that “early”
empirical studies found otherwise, but contending that recent empirical studies support the
orthodox consensus in favor of mandatory disclosure); Prentice, supra note 61, at 1495–99
(presenting empirical findings to show that “American-style securities regulation [is] the
optimal approach to producing efficient securities markets”); Fox, supra note 61, at 1393
(“There is affirmative evidence for the proposition that mandatory disclosure has increased
the amount of meaningful information in the market and has improved price accuracy.”). In
the end, the empirical data is inconclusive. Fox, supra note 61, at 1394; REINIER KRAAKMAN
ET AL., THE ANATOMY OF CORPORATE LAW: A COMPARATIVE AND FUNCTIONAL APPROACH
204 (1st ed. 2004) [hereinafter KRAAKMAN (2004)] (“[B]oth supporters and critics of the
U.S. mandatory disclosure legislation . . . acknowledge that empirical studies can neither
demonstrate that their benefits outweigh their costs, nor show the converse.”).
81
REINIER KRAAKMAN ET AL., THE ANATOMY OF CORPORATE LAW: A COMPARATIVE
AND FUNCTIONAL APPROACH 246 (3d ed. 2017) [hereinafter KRAAKMAN (2017)] (“The case
for mandatory disclosure [is premised on the concern] that firms will not disclose sufficient,
or sufficiently comparable, information without it.”); Enriques & Gilotta, supra note 65, at
514 (“Today, nobody seriously argues that protecting investors via disclosure is a proper
policy just because doing so is . . . just. Many, instead, and especially policymakers, contend
that protecting investors is instrumental to the well-functioning—if not to the very
existence—of the market and has thus an efficiency justification.”); Merritt B. Fox,
Rethinking Disclosure Liability in the Modern Era, 75 WASH. U. L.Q. 903, 915 (1997)
(“[T]he function of mandatory disclosure is efficiency—improved selection of the proposed
new investment projects in the economy and improved operation of existing ones—not
investor protection.”). A third, weaker, theory for mandatory disclosure is based on “the
value of standardization” which improves comparability between firms. But this can be
achieved through private standard-setting bodies, like the NYSE. KRAAKMAN (2017), supra
note 81, at 246 (making the modest claim that “mandatory disclosure may accelerate the
standardization process”); EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 4.
82
See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8 § 141(a) (2019) (providing that the board of directors
shall manage the corporation).
83
EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 4, at 217 (“Once they are ensconced, and have
raised the capital the firm needs, managers may elect to behave opportunistically—to
maintain themselves in office or raise their compensation at the expense of investors.”);
KRAAKMAN (2017), supra note 81, at 245–58; EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 4, 9–
10; Victor Brudney, Insiders, Outsiders, and Informational Advantages Under the Federal
Securities Laws, 93 HARV. L. REV. 322, 336–38 (1979); Zohar Goshen & Gideon
Parchomovsky, The Essential Role of Securities Regulation, 55 DUKE L.J. 711, 718 (2006).

1086

UTAH LAW REVIEW

[NO. 5

corporation (CEO, etc.) have different incentives than the shareholders.84 In
particular, corporate management would surely be disinclined to share certain types
of news with investors lest they get demoted or terminated, especially items that put
them personally in a bad light.85 Furthermore, shareholders might be glad to go along
with minimal disclosure of bad news, since the value of their holdings would go
down upon release.86 This is an unfortunate reality, as this kind of information would
be socially useful for the world to know so the market price for a stock can reflect
its true value based on all accurate information.87 Mandatory disclosure offers one
solution to the fundamental agency problem of the corporate form by mandating that
this information becomes publicly available.88
2. Information Underproduction
Second, there is the theoretical claim that “mandatory disclosure [helps] market
participants to determine prices for securities that accurately reflect all available
information,” thereby enhancing social welfare.89 Disclosure must be mandated
because it might not be forthcoming voluntarily, such as when “the private benefits
of disclosure to issuers may be less than its social benefits to market participants.”90
The idea is that left to their own devices, companies might not provide as much
disclosure as diversified investors would like, due to collective-action problems.91

84

See, e.g., EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 4, at 9–10; BERLE & MEANS, supra
note 8, at 6; Jensen & Meckling, supra note 8, at 308; KRAAKMAN (2017), supra note 81, at
246.
85
KRAAKMAN (2004), supra note 80, at 246; cf., e.g., Thomas Gryta et al., GE Board
in Dark on CEO’s Use of Extra Jet, WALL ST. J., Oct. 30, 2017, at B1 (“General Electric Co.
executives didn’t notify the company’s board until this month about its regular flying of a
spare business jet for its chief executive . . . . While CEO, Mr. Immelt wanted a backup jet
in case there was a mechanical issue that could lead to delays . . . . Flight crews were told to
not openly refer to the backup planes, for fear of raising eyebrows . . . . One person said the
flight manifest sometimes listed ‘Robert Jeffries’ or ‘Jeffrey Roberts’ as the passenger on
the second plane, when in fact the seats were empty.”).
86
KRAAKMAN (2004), supra note 80, at 278.
87
KRAAKMAN (2017), supra note 81, at 246–48.
88
Paul G. Mahoney, Mandatory Disclosure as a Solution to Agency Problems, 62 U.
CHI. L. REV. 1047, 1048 (1995) (contending that “the principal purpose of mandatory
disclosure is to address certain agency problems . . .”).
89
Id. at 1048.
90
KRAAKMAN (2017), supra note 81, at 246; see also EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra
note 4, 290–91; Easterbrook & Fischel, Protection of Investors, supra note 33, at 673–80.
91
EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 4, at 290–91 (“The information produced by
one firm for its investors may be valuable to investors of other firms . . . . Yet firm A cannot
charge the investors in these other firms for the benefits, although they would be willing to
pay for them. Because they cannot be charged, the information will be underproduced.”).
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For example, a company might rationally decide not to disclose a certain piece of
information, even if investors would want to know it because doing so would aid a
competitor.92
These two justifications for mandatory disclosure—agency costs and
underproduction of information—have sound theoretical bases and have proved
persuasive to the current generation of securities law scholars and policymakers.93
The overwhelming consensus in the field remains that mandatory disclosure is both
beneficial and efficient, and should remain as the essential component of securities
regulation both in the United States and abroad.94 A substantial majority of securities
law scholars—including Professors John Coffee, Merritt Fox, Alan Ferrell, Reiner
Kraakman, Robert Prentice, and Michael Guttentag—practitioners, and regulators
all support the modern theory in favor of mandatory disclosure.95
III. THE MODERN THEORY DOES NOT APPLY TO PRIMARY OFFERINGS
The previous Part described the powerful and popular modern theory in favor
of mandatory disclosure in public stock markets. Yet, for all its strength and all its
adherents, that consensus ultimately rests on just two theoretical justifications—(1)
agency costs, and (2) information underproduction. And while these two theories
apply quite obviously and directly to a secondary market (where investors trade
securities with one another), they have only a limited relationship with the primary
market (where companies issue securities to investors), as this Part establishes. The
upshot is that the modern theory should be conceptually limited in application to
92

KRAAKMAN (2017), supra note 81, at 246–48.
de Fontenay, Deregulation of Private Capital, supra note 61, at 477 (“[T]he
contemporary case for imposing disclosure requirements on firms rests primarily on
collective action problems and agency costs that disincentivize voluntary corporate
disclosure.”).
94
KRAAKMAN (2004), supra note 80, at 204 (“Despite academic criticism, however, the
majority view among both scholars and regulators is that public companies would
underproduce information in the absence of mandatory disclosure.”); Fox, supra note 61, at
1339–40, 1339 n.13 (identifying only a handful of “prominent dissenter[s]” from the
consensus view). This is true not only in the United States but around the world. See Allen
Ferrell, The Case for Mandatory Disclosure in Securities Regulation Around the World, 2
BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 81, 125 (2007) (“[T]he case for mandatory disclosure is
strong for virtually all countries around the world.”); Prentice, supra note 61, at 1495
(discussing the “developing global consensus favoring American-style securities regulation
as the optimal approach to producing efficient securities markets”).
95
KRAAKMAN (2009), supra note 80, at 279 (Although “legal scholars continue to
debate how far issuers should be given discretion over disclosure in public markets[, i]n our
view recent scholarship supports the conventional view that publicly-traded firms underreport information without legal compulsion.”). Even the authors of an article called The
Failure of Mandated Disclosure accept that mandatory disclosure is appropriate for the
securities context. See Omri Ben-Shahar & Carl E. Schneider, The Failure of Mandated
Disclosure, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 647, 732 (2011).
93
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secondary markets. A further lesson is that scholars ought to seriously entertain the
possibility that mandatory disclosure may not be required, or even helpful, for
primary offerings.
A. The Two Theoretical Bases of the Modern Theory Are Addressed to Secondary
Markets, not Primary Offerings
Recall that there are powerful economic incentives for corporate insiders and
promoters to voluntarily provide full and fair disclosure to potential investors in a
primary offering.96 This is a function both of the signaling theory discussed above97
and the long-term interest of the exchange, which hopes to entice investors to return
to buy into future offerings.98 Nevertheless, as this Article showed in Part I, this
theory of voluntary disclosure has largely been overcome by two powerful law-andeconomics concepts that undermine it: (1) agency costs, and (2) information
underproduction.99
These concepts, however, pertain almost entirely to the secondary market and
are largely inapplicable in the context of primary offerings, as this Section will
explain.100 Agency costs are irrelevant to primary offerings, simply because there
can be no agents until there are shareholders.101 And while information
underproduction is not totally irrelevant in the context of primary offerings, it holds
little force as a practical matter.102

96

EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 4, at 288–90; Seligman, supra note 62, at 61
(“In theory, it can be argued that a mandatory corporate disclosure system is unnecessary
because corporate managers possess sufficient incentives to voluntarily disclose all or
virtually all information material to investors. These incentives are strongest with respect to
new issues.”) (emphasis added).
97
See supra Section II.B; see, e.g., de Fontenay, Deregulation of Private Capital, supra
note 61, at 475 (stating “issuers therefore face powerful market incentives to disclose
precisely the amount and type of information that potential investors desire”).
98
Mahoney, supra note 3, at 1465–70.
99
Supra Section I.B.1-2; de Fontenay, Deregulation of Private Capital, supra note 61,
at 477–78.
100
Cf. KRAAKMAN (2017), supra note 81, at 247–52 (explaining how the value of
mandatory disclosure on the secondary market can have a knock-on benefit for the primary
market).
101
Infra Section II.A.1.
102
Id.
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1. Agency Costs
Agency costs refer to misbehavior by the board of directors, CEO, and other
managers (agents) of a public company whose shares are already widely dispersed.
Agency costs are purely a function of a secondary market where public investors
have already paid over their capital and must hope that the management will work
diligently for the corporate interest.103
As Easterbrook and Fischel explain, “[o]nce they are ensconced, and have
raised the capital the firm needs,” managers have the chance to behave
opportunistically and take advantage of the investors.104 But this can only happen
once they are ensconced. In other words, it is only after a primary offering occurs
that managers have the power to oppress the investors whose capital they (now)
control. Before that moment, agency costs are physically impossible. Outsiders have
not yet handed over their money. Therefore, there are no principals and no agents
(yet).105 In short, the concept of agency costs has no logical application in the context
of primary markets.
2. Information Underproduction
Information underproduction is based on the idea that information is a valuable
public good because it enhances the accuracy of the prices at which securities trade
on the secondary market. Recall the example where McDonald’s has access to
information relevant to the valuation of Coca-Cola. The secondary market benefits
from the disclosure of such information because this information would allow
traders to better estimate the value of Coca-Cola. However, actually obtaining this
information is costly and the actor holding the information (McDonald’s) would not
capture the full benefits of disclosure if they released the information, leading to the
concern that it will not be disclosed. The issue, importantly, is much bigger than
Coke and McDonald’s. Many, perhaps all, companies have access to information
that they do or could collect that would help traders value other companies. In the
absence of compulsion, none of the companies would collect and disclose this
information, leaving them all worse off than they could have been if they all
cooperated. Mandatory disclosure can remedy this problem, and thereby benefit
participants in the secondary markets.
Note that this issue of information underproduction is entirely about the
secondary market. Mandatory disclosure can induce cooperation among issuers so
103

Cf. Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, The Corporate Contract, 89 COLUM.
L. REV. 1416, 1419 (1989) (“Managers and investors . . . assume their roles with knowledge
of the consequences. Investors part with their money willingly, putting dollars in equities
instead of bonds or banks or land or gold because they believe the returns of equities more
attractive. Managers obtain their positions after much trouble and toil, competing against
others who wanted them . . . . They must attract . . . investors by promising and delivering
what those people value.”).
104
EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 4, at 217.
105
Cf. id. at 4 (“Investors part with their money willingly . . . .”).
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that they provide all the information that market participants want, thereby allowing
traders to more accurately value the securities being traded in the secondary market.
That concept is all well and good, but it does not directly relate to primary offerings.
Still, there is at least one sense in which information underproduction may be a
concern in the context of primary offerings: a company making a primary offering
may have information useful for the secondary market. A company that has not yet
gone public itself may still possess information that affects the accurate valuation of
publicly-traded companies. However, the knowledgeable company would still lack
a full incentive to determine or disclose that information because it might not capture
the full benefits of doing so.
For instance, when Tesla held its IPO in 2010, it probably held certain
information about electric cars that was relevant to the stock price for Ford or
General Motors. Information underproduction could possibly pose an issue in such
circumstances. Absent mandatory disclosure, Tesla may have found it inefficient to
disclose that information because it might have been helpful to traders of Ford or
GM, as these companies are direct competitors. Additionally, investors would have
sound theoretical reason to fear that Tesla might not offer certain disclosures that
would benefit their business rivals unless compelled to do so. Thus, information
underproduction may have some relevance to the primary market.
But this Article will not overstate the case. For one thing, the private incentives
to offer precise “signals” of quality are at their strongest when dealing with primary
offerings.106 For another, sophisticated actors in the primary markets, such as
exchanges and underwriters, are in a position to demand (and receive) all the
information they desire about the issuer. Thus, the primary context provides scholars
with less reason to worry about information underproduction than does the
secondary market. In addition, primary offerings occur relatively infrequently, on a
one-off basis. Conversely, the secondary market goes on every day. So, information
underproduction is only a problem in the primary market as a one-time issue for each
issuer, as opposed to an ongoing problem.
Furthermore, as a general rule, IPO companies are smaller and younger than
those already public. As a result, IPO companies do not have much information that
the market otherwise lacks. For example, the following companies conducted the
largest IPOs on the New York Stock Exchange in November 2018: CNFinance
Holdings, Eton Pharmaceuticals, Vapotherm, Weidai, Bain Capital Specialty
Finance, and TuanChe.107 None of these are household names, and none likely hold
anywhere near the same amount of market-relevant information that already-public
companies do. The information they provide (or not) in connection with their IPOs
hold only slight relevance for the companies whose securities are already traded on
the secondary market.

106

See supra Section II.B (explaining the concept of signaling).
IPO Data, NYSE, www.nyse.com/ipo-center/recent-ipo [https://perma.cc/TF783LDQ] (last visited Feb. 4, 2019).
107

2019]

MANDATORY DISCLOSURE IN PRIMARY MARKETS

1091

For all these reasons, the concept of information underproduction has only very
limited relevance in the context of a primary market. Although there are exceptions,
information underproduction is generally not an issue in the primary market.
B. Primary Offerings Do Not Necessarily Require Full Mandatory Disclosure
As this Article just demonstrated, the two theoretical bases underlying the
modern theory of mandatory disclosure—agency costs and information
underproduction—have little to no relevance to the primary market. It follows from
this analysis that mandatory disclosure is not a necessary component of a wellfunctioning primary market. Furthermore, the theory of voluntary disclosure—that
founders and companies have a private incentive to provide the optimal level of
information that shareholders would desire—applies clearly and directly to primary
markets.108 Primary public stock markets thus appear to be free of the market failures
that led to the modern theory in favor of mandatory disclosure.109
Nevertheless, the anticipated benefits of mandatory disclosure in a secondary
market could indirectly impact the primary market.110 For instance, if a primary
investor expects that corporate management will be well-behaved thanks to
mandatory disclosure imposed as part of the secondary market, she will pay a higher
price to the company than she would otherwise.111 But this argument is really just
another in favor of mandatory disclosure in the secondary market. Therefore, this
argument is not directly relevant to whether the law should mandate disclosure for
primary offerings.
One final objection to the idea presented here is that an IPO lasts a millisecond,
while the secondary trading of the shares sold to the public will go on every business
day, potentially for decades. Even if a company were excused from mandatory
disclosure in the IPO (primary market), this excuse would hardly make a difference
because the company would be immediately subject to mandatory disclosure in the
secondary market where its shares would later trade. This objection is true, as far as
it goes, but it also shows how wedded scholars are to our traditional conceptions of
a public stock market.
Yes, a company that does an IPO on the New York Stock Exchange (or similar)
is immediately subject to mandatory disclosure under the Securities Exchange Act
108

Romano, supra note 3, at 2374 (“Because firms need capital and investors need
information, firms have powerful incentives to disclose information if they are to compete
successfully for funds against alternative investment opportunities.”).
109
It is possible that other, unidentified market failures (other than agency costs or
information underproduction) could support mandatory disclosure in the primary market,
providing an objection to this Article’s claim. Yet, as far as research reveals, the existing
literature does not appear to introduce any additional theories that could apply to the primary
market context.
110
KRAAKMAN (2017), supra note 81, at 245 (“[T]he prospect of a liquid [secondary]
market is relevant to primary markets.”).
111
See id.
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of 1934 once it enters the secondary market.112 But the New York Stock Exchange
is not the only type of public stock market, theoretically. One could, for instance,
conceive that a public stock market could operate solely in a primary capacity, with
no secondary trading. Shareholders would buy shares straight from the company and
then hold them, rather than trade them.113 Such a primary-only market could truly
be free of mandatory disclosure. The equity crowdfunding market in New Zealand
is one real-world example of a primary-only market, as this Article explains in Part
III.
Alternatively, the United States could have some sort of reduced disclosure rule
for IPOs, and then ramp up the level of disclosure over time once the shares begin
trading in the secondary market. Thus, the disclosure rule would be more like a
gradual on-ramp than an immediate jump to full disclosure obligations. The “on
ramp” provisions of the JOBS Act of 2012 provide an example of this idea in
practice.114 Essentially, these rules allow relatively small companies (“emerging
growth companies”) to launch an IPO without complying with the full level of
mandatory disclosure and then to provide only limited disclosure for several years
thereafter.115 After a set number of years, these issuers become subject to the
ordinary disclosure obligations of public companies. This model is consistent with
the thesis herein.
To summarize, because the modern theory in favor of mandatory disclosure is
built on concepts that relate almost exclusively to the secondary market, this theory
has little persuasive force when it comes to the primary market. This concept leads
directly to the seemingly radical suggestion that the United States can have a wellfunctioning public stock market without mandatory disclosure, as long as this market
is limited to primary offerings.
C. A Resolution to the Persistent Disagreement Over the Modern Theory
The analysis presented here also may explain why scholars continue to dissent
against the modern theory of mandatory disclosure, even after all these decades.
Those in support of mandatory disclosure tend to focus on the secondary market,
while those in dissent tend to focus on the primary market. If the thesis of the present
work is accepted, then both camps may be correct.
Treatises and articles in support or defense of the modern theory are full of
terms like “market price,” “traders,” and “liquidity.” These ideas all relate to the
secondary market, not the primary market.116 For example, one key article by Merritt
112

See Benston, supra note 80, at 133.
In lieu of an ‘exit’ through the secondary market, such shareholders could, say, have
the right to sell their shares back to the company (maybe once a year) at an appraised value.
Other alternatives are possible.
114
Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act, Pub. L. No. 112–106, Tit. I, 126 Stat. 315
(2012) (codified at 15 U.S.C. §78a (2012)).
115
Id.
116
E.g., KRAAKMAN (2017), supra note 81, at 244–55; Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier H.
113
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Fox explains that shareholders benefit from mandatory “periodic disclosure”
because it “increases the effectiveness of a number of devices—the shareholder vote,
shareholder enforcement of management’s fiduciary duties, and the hostile takeover
threat—that work to limit the ability of managers to deviate from acting in the
shareholders’ best interests.”117 Each of the devices Professor Fox cites are features
of the secondary market only; they have no relevance to a primary market.
Likewise, Professor Coffee’s classic article in support of the modern theory is
based primarily on the idea that information is a “public good” and mandatory
disclosure is therefore needed to ensure accurate pricing of securities traded on the
secondary market.118 In a similar vein, one leading treatise describes the “principal
purpose” of mandatory disclosure to be that it “enhance[s] price informativeness
[among] traders” in the secondary market, who “impound new information into price
extremely rapidly,” which “enhances liquidity [and] allows companies to use market
prices as benchmarks of performance.”119 Market prices, traders, research, and
informative prices all refer to the secondary market of securities trading rather than
the primary market of securities issuance.
In contrast, the few scholars who dissent from the modern theory often focus
on the primary market. Judge Easterbrook and Professor Fischel, for instance, use
the example of “a firm that wants to issue new securities” to explain their influential
challenge to the modern theory.120 Professor Roberta Romano similarly observes,
“[b]ecause firms need capital and investors need information, firms have powerful

Kraakman, The Mechanisms of Market Efficiency, 70 VA. L. REV. 549, passim (1984);
Coffee, supra note 6, at 726–27.
117
Fox, supra note 61, at 1355–56.
118
Coffee, supra note 6, at 734–37 (“[Because] the securities market [is] the principal
allocative mechanism for investment capital, the behavior of securities prices is important
not so much because of their distributive consequences on investors but more because of
their effect on allocative efficiency. In this light, it is important not only that the game be
fair, but that it be accurate—that is, that capital be correctly priced. Depending on a firm’s
share price, its cost for obtaining capital will be either too high or low as compared to the
cost that would prevail in a perfectly efficient market.”).
119
KRAAKMAN (2017), supra note 81, at 247; see also, e.g., Gilson & Kraakman, supra
note 116, at 638–39 (suggesting that the “market participants [who benefit] most from
mandatory disclosure . . . [are] members of the professional trading community”).
120
EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 4, at 288–89 (“These arguments [in support
of the modern theory] share a problem, because they leap from the benefit of disclosure to
the benefit of mandatory disclosure . . . . Take a firm that wants to issue new securities . . . .”).
But cf. id. at 289 (“Self-induced disclosure occurs in the secondary market too.”); Mahoney,
supra note 3, at 1465 (“It is more analytically tidy to consider new-issue disclosure as a
species of corporate law (albeit federal corporate law) than as a portion of the regulatory
system for securities markets.”).
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incentives to disclose information if they are to compete successfully for funds
against alternative investment opportunities.”121 She similarly observes that the
prospect of future primary offerings can drive secondary-market disclosure itself.122
With an appreciation that the principles underlying the modern theory in favor
of mandatory disclosure are largely inapplicable to the primary market, one can see
that the supposed conflict between supporters and dissenters may be more apparent
than real. In truth, they each may be correct in their domain. Supporters may well be
right that mandatory disclosure is beneficial or necessary in secondary markets. And
dissenters may likewise be correct that mandatory disclosure is useless or harmful
in primary markets.
From time to time, scholars have recognized this possibility, although they have
not dwelt on it. Professor Coffee, for instance, has acknowledged that the dissenters’
argument “does seem to have some validity as applied to initial public offerings and,
to a lesser extent, to all primary distributions.”123 Professor Palmiter has likewise
suggested that the argument in favor of mandatory disclosure is “flawed” because it
“assumes market failure without distinguishing between primary and secondary
markets.”124 More recently, Professors Henderson and Haeberle have taken care to
exclude the primary market from their ongoing discussion of federal securities
regulation.125
More commonly, however, supporters and opponents of mandatory disclosure
have failed to expressly delineate between the primary and secondary markets,
leading them to speak past one another.126 One contribution of the present work is
to highlight the important distinction between primary and secondary markets and
to show that these parties may both be right. In addition, there is an interesting
interplay between the two, with companies voluntarily providing information for
traders on the secondary market to facilitate future primary offerings. Even so, it
behooves scholars to keep the two markets separate for purposes of mandatory
disclosure.
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Romano, supra note 3, at 2374.
Id. (“[S]tudies have found that the quantity and quality of publicly traded firms’
voluntary disclosures (such as earnings forecasts) are positively correlated with the issuance
of securities.”).
123
Coffee, supra note 6, at 746 (saying that while “the theory of voluntary disclosure”
was not persuasive with regard to “secondary market trading,” it “does seem to have some
validity as applied to initial public offerings and, to a lesser extent, to all primary
distributions”).
124
Alan R. Palmiter, Toward Disclosure Choice in Securities Offerings, 1999 COLUM.
BUS. L. REV. 1, 128–29 (1999).
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Haeberle & Henderson, supra note 30, at 385 n.3 (“We do not address the
disclosures that must be made when firms first sell stock to the public in an IPO. Instead, we
focus on only ongoing disclosure by public firms as well as disclosures associated with
secondary offerings of securities by the same.”).
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See infra Section II.A.2.C.
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IV. REAL-WORLD EXAMPLE: EQUITY CROWDFUNDING IN NEW ZEALAND
The core claim of this Article—that the modern theory of mandatory disclosure
is generally inapplicable to primary offerings—has thus far been premised entirely
on theoretical arguments and ideas. To buttress the claim, this Part presents an
empirical report on equity crowdfunding in New Zealand—a real-world public
market for primary offerings that operates without mandatory disclosure. As this
Part will show, New Zealand’s equity crowdfunding market functions well in the
absence of mandatory disclosure and, indeed, has outpaced the American system,
which retained mandatory disclosure as part of its equity crowdfunding law.127
A. Background on Equity Crowdfunding
Equity crowdfunding is a novel way for a company to make a primary offering
to the public through Internet-based platforms (or portals) and is based on the prior
practice of “reward” crowdfunding, as on Kickstarter and similar websites.128
Reward crowdfunding is an Internet-based marketplace for the financing of
entrepreneurial projects whereby an artist or entrepreneur posts to a dedicated
website a description of the project she wants to pursue, the amount of money she
needs to fund it, and usually promises some sort of reward or benefit to those who
provide funding. Members of the public—the crowd—peruse the various projects
available on the website, decide which one(s) they want to support, and then pledge
their money to the cause. If and when a given project reaches its target funding
amount, the platform collects the money and transmits it to the entrepreneur. On
some crowdfunding sites (including Kickstarter), if a project fails to reach the target,
the platform nullifies the pledges, and no money changes hands. This is known as
an “all-or-nothing” rule.
For example, a rock band that wants to record an album might post the idea
along with a sample track and ask the crowd to contribute 20 dollars per person. In
return, the band promises to send a copy of the CD once the band completes it. The
band uses the money it collects upfront to rent a recording studio, hire a producer,
et cetera. This simple idea has grown into a multi-billion-dollar market in less than
a decade. Kickstarter alone reports that users have contributed more than 4 billion
dollars on its website since its founding in 2009.129
Equity crowdfunding is based on reward crowdfunding and simply extends the
concept to investments.130 It works just like reward crowdfunding except that,
instead of receiving a tangible reward like a CD from a band, the financial backers
127

Portions of this Part are adapted from Schwartz, Equity Crowdfunding in New
Zealand, supra note 23, at 246–54, and Schwartz, Gatekeepers, supra note 18, at 930–37.
128
Schwartz, supra note 1, at 1459–60.
129
Stats, KICKSTARTER, https://www.kickstarter.com/help/stats?ref=global-footer
[https://perma.cc/8SRB-G3VU] (last updated Sept. 12, 2019).
130
Schwartz, supra note 1, at 1460.
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get a share of stock or some other security, such as a share in the band’s profits on
the sale of the CD.
This novel method of online investing holds great promise, but it also violates
the usual legal rules for making a public offer of securities in the United States. For,
under the Securities Act of 1933, a company is legally required to “register” any
shares of stock, bonds or other securities before offering them to the public.131 As
demonstrated in Part II.A, this registration process calls for copious mandatory
disclosure about the company and the securities to be offered, 132 the costs of which
can be millions of dollars. This cost presents an obvious hurdle for the startups and
small businesses that might look to crowdfunding for financial capital.133
Thus over the past few years, the United States and other countries, including
New Zealand, sought to legalize and encourage equity crowdfunding by amending
their securities laws to expressly exempt small-scale equity crowdfunding from the
usual registration requirement.134 In the United States, the JOBS Act of 2012
exempted equity crowdfunding from the registration rules, including the normal
rules of mandatory disclosure, but then added a different, more simplified set of
mandatory disclosures for companies to make.135 New Zealand went even further,
exempting equity crowdfunding from mandatory disclosure entirely.136
B. New Zealand Equity Crowdfunding: No Mandatory Disclosure
New Zealand legalized equity crowdfunding in the Financial Markets Conduct
Act of 2013. That statute was expressly modeled on the American JOBS Act of the
prior year.137 However, the New Zealand version is much more liberal (in the classic
sense; New Zealanders would call it ‘light-handed’) in that it imposes very few rules
and regulations on the practice.138 Most importantly, issuing companies have no
131

15 U.S.C. § 77e(a)(1) (2012).
See 17 C.F.R. § 229 (2018) (instructions for filing registration statement).
133
Schwartz, supra note 1, at 1468–70.
134
The United States, New Zealand and other jurisdictions have all included an annual
issuance cap of about $1 million in their equity crowdfunding laws, meaning that a company
may only issue $1 million worth of securities per year through this exemption.
135
Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act, Pub. L. No. 112–106, § 302, 126 Stat. 306
(2012) (codified 15 U.S.C. §§77a, 77b, 77d, 77g, 77r, 78c, 78a, 78c, 78l, and 78o).
136
FINANCIAL MARKETS CONDUCT ACT 2013, Schedule 1, § 6(1)(a) (“An offer of
financial products to a person (A) does not require disclosure under Part 3 of this Act if the
offer is through a licensed intermediary in the course of supplying prescribed intermediary
services to (A).”); FINANCIAL MARKETS CONDUCT REGULATIONS 2014 § 184(a) (defining
equity crowdfunding as a “prescribed intermediary service”).
137
OFFICE OF THE MINISTER OF COMMERCE, FINANCIAL MARKETS CONDUCT
REGULATIONS PAPER 4 — LICENSING REGIMES 136–43 (Cabinet Bus. Comm. PrintBusiness
Committee June 2013).
138
See Henry William Hillind, Exploiting the Crowd: The New Zealand Response to
Equity Crowd Funding, 21 N.Z. BUS. L.Q. 46, 52 (2015) (describing the New Zealand
approach to crowdfunding as “more liberal compared to international jurisdictions”).
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mandatory disclosure obligations under the New Zealand crowdfunding law. This
lack of obligations greatly simplifies the process and lowers the cost of selling shares
to the public.139 In the United States, although the JOBS Act simplified the
disclosure process for crowdfunding issuers, issuers are still legally required to
provide significant and specific financial and business disclosures.140 In New
Zealand, this is not the case.
New Zealand relies on private ordering rather than legal obligations to achieve
effective disclosure.141 Hence, New Zealand crowdfunding platforms are required to
implement “disclosure arrangements” that are “adequate” to provide potential
investors with information relevant to their decision to invest; but the content,
manner, and style of disclosure is a business decision for the platform.142
Furthermore, issuing companies need not file anything at all with the FMA (New
Zealand’s SEC-equivalent). This model is very different from the American model
of equity crowdfunding with its requirement that issuers file a standardized
government-drafted form (Form C) with 25 specific items of mandatory
disclosure.143
C. Empirical Report on New Zealand Equity Crowdfunding
New Zealand’s equity crowdfunding market presents a useful test-case for this
Article’s critique of the modern theory of mandatory disclosure. This Article argues
that, because the underpinnings of the modern theory relate to the secondary market,
a primary securities market should be able to function well without mandatory
disclosure. By legalizing an equity crowdfunding market with no mandatory
disclosure, New Zealand has put this claim to the test. What has this experiment
shown?
New Zealand’s liberal model, including its abandonment of mandatory
disclosure, has generated a successful equity crowdfunding market that compares
favorably with American venture capitalism (VC) and angel investment.
Furthermore, from a financial perspective, New Zealand has greatly outpaced the
United States (who, like most jurisdictions, retained mandatory disclosure for its
crowdfunding market), and has suffered no fraud and very few business failures.
139

FINANCIAL MARKETS CONDUCT ACT 2013, Schedule 1, § 6(1)(a) (“An offer of
financial products to a person (A) does not require disclosure under Part 3 of this Act if the
offer is through a licensed intermediary in the course of supplying prescribed intermediary
services to (A).”); FINANCIAL MARKETS CONDUCT REGULATIONS 2014 § 184(a) (defining
equity crowdfunding as a “prescribed intermediary service”).
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Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act §302, 126 Stat. at 315–321.
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See infra Section III.D.
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Financial Markets Conduct Regulations 2014, Reg. 186(1)(d).
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17 C.F.R. §§ 227.201(a)–(y) (2018) (“An issuer offering or selling securities [via
equity crowdfunding] . . . must file with the Commission and provide to investors and the
relevant intermediary the following information . . . .”); 17 C.F.R. § 239.900 (2018) (Form
C).
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In the first year of equity crowdfunding in New Zealand,144 27 crowdfunding
campaigns were launched, and 21 of those succeeded in reaching their financial
target, indicating a 78% success rate.145 The 21 successful campaigns collectively
raised a total of $10 million.146 The average amount raised was about $500,000, with
two campaigns reaching the legal crowdfunding limit of NZ$2 million.147 These
numbers represent a significant contribution of capital to New Zealand
entrepreneurs, as one can see when comparing them to the amounts invested by New
Zealand VC and angel investors. In 2014, New Zealand angels invested $45 million
in 118 deals,148 and New Zealand VC funds likewise contributed $45 million in total,
spread across 62 investments.149 Equity crowdfunding’s first-year total of $10
million and 21 deals, while lower than the totals of VCs or angels, is in the same
ballpark.
New Zealand’s numbers are even more impressive when compared to the
American experience. In its first year of operation, from mid-2016 to mid-2017, the
United States saw 211 crowdfunding campaigns in total, 112 of which were
successful, thus representing a 53% success rate.150 The total amount raised by all
successful campaigns was about $35 million.151 The average amount raised was
about $300,000, with nine campaigns hitting the $1 million maximum.152
To properly compare New Zealand and the United States, one must account for
the fact that the American economy is about 100 times as large as that of New
Zealand.153 If one were to scale New Zealand’s figures up by a factor of 100, which
144
The analysis here compares the first year of crowdfunding in each jurisdiction. In
the United States, this was 2016–17; in New Zealand, this was 2014–15.
145
New Zealand Equity Crowdfunding—1st Year in Review, CROWDREADY (Aug. 18,
2015).
146
Id. The currency conversions in this section are based on a 0.8 conversion rate
between the New Zealand Dollar and the United States Dollar, which was the approximate
rate at the time in question (2014–2015), and are rounded for the sake of simplicity.
147
Id.
148
NEW ZEALAND GOVERNMENT, TOWARDS 2025, BUSINESS GROWTH AGENDA
PROGRESS REPORT (Sept. 8, 2015) https://www.beehive.govt.nz/sites/default/files/Business
%20Growth%20Agenda%20-%20Towards%202025.pdf [https://perma.cc/R2J4-J33Y].
149
NEW ZEALAND PRIVATE EQUITY & VENTURE CAPITAL CAP. ASS’N, NEW ZEALAND
PRIVATE EQUITY AND VENTURE CAPITAL MONITOR: 2014 FULL YEAR REVIEW (2014)
https://www.nzvca.co.nz/wp-content/uploads/2014/04/1527715_NZPEVC-Monitor_web
.pdf [https://perma.cc/PYB9-YDEB].
150
CCA Regulation Crowdfunding Indices, CROWDFUNDING CAP. ADVISORS (July 28,
2016), https://crowdfundcapitaladvisors.com/cca-reg-cf-index/ [https://perma.cc/9NT6VE7F]; see also The Current Status of Regulation Crowdfunding, WEFUNDER,
https://wefunder.com/stats [https://perma.cc/B3RP-Y3ZE] (last visited July 1, 2019).
151
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Id.
153
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is only fair, New Zealand’s equity crowdfunding market would be orders of
magnitude larger than that of the United States. Based on such a calculation, New
Zealand had 13 times as many campaigns as the United States, those campaigns had
a success rate of nearly 80%, compared to the American rate of about 50%, and New
Zealand companies raised 30 times as much money as did their American
counterparts.
Moreover, looking at the history of New Zealand equity crowdfunding, with
dozens of companies funded and tens of millions of dollars raised, not a single
funded company has been revealed to be a fraud, and there has been just one
liquidation.154 Admittedly, the time period is short (just four years), and New
Zealand’s economy, in general, has done well over that time, meaning that fraud
may yet be revealed in some future period when economic conditions are less
forgiving. In addition, recent equity crowdfunding in the United States has grown
significantly since its first year in operation.155 Even taking this growth into account,
New Zealand’s market remains an order of magnitude larger than that of the United
States, thus demonstrating the effectiveness of New Zealand’s system.
D. Private Ordering in New Zealand Equity Crowdfunding
How did New Zealand generate such a successful equity crowdfunding market
without mandatory disclosure? First, because New Zealand’s legal regulations are
simple and few, compliance costs appear to be much lower than in a traditional IPO
or even in an American equity crowdfunding campaign.156 Second, and more
importantly for present purposes, New Zealand’s crowdfunding system depends on
private actors to organize the market, keep it honest, and make it work well, all
without direct participation on the part of the government.157 Pursuant to this design,
/S2HA-VMSX] (last visited June 25, 2019).
154
Interview with Hayley Buckley, Partner, Wynn Williams, in Auckland, N.Z. (May
18, 2017); Paul McBeth, Balex Marine, Snowball Crowdfunder Participant, Sunk by High
Costs, Slow Sales, NAT’L BUS. REV. (May 17, 2017) (reporting on the first crowdfunding
company to liquidate).
155
Since Title III of the Jobs Act went into effect, the number of equity crowdfunding
offerings has increased each year. In 2016, during the first seven months that Regulation
Crowdfunding was in effect, American companies launched 188 equity crowdfunding
campaigns. In 2017, the number of offerings rose to 514, and in 2018, this number rose again
to 732 offerings, an increase of 42% from the prior year. Andrew A. Schwartz, Crowdfunding
Issuers in the United States, 58 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y (forthcoming 2019). Similarly, the
total amount raised in 2017 was $71 million; in 2018 that grew to $109 million. The 2018
State of Regulation Crowdfunding, CROWDFUND CAP. ADVISORS, (Jan. 24, 2019),
https://cdn.crowdfundinsider.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/02/CCA-2018-State-ofRegulation-Crowdfunding-Summary-FINAL.pdf [https://perma.cc/8FYZ-DBG7].
156
See Schwartz, Equity Crowdfunding in New Zealand, supra note 23, at 252–54
(discussing compliance costs under the U.S. crowdfunding policies).
157
See id. at 272–73.
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market participants have established numerous effective modes of private ordering
or private governance, the most important of which are “gatekeepers” and
“syndication.”
First, New Zealand’s law envisions that the licensed crowdfunding platforms
would act as “gatekeepers” that only allow legitimate and promising companies to
access the crowd. 158 Platforms have a direct economic interest in establishing and
maintaining a reputation as a reliable place for investors to put their money.159 If
they allow fraudulent or low-quality companies onto their site, and investors lose
money, those investors will not come back, and the platform will go out of
business.160 Knowing all this, platforms can be expected to only invite legitimate
and sound companies to participate on their sites.161 The platform’s gatekeeping role
thus protects investors and gives them the confidence to participate in the market.
In practice, New Zealand platforms take their gatekeeper role seriously and are
very selective in deciding which companies to allow to list on their site.162 They
understand how vital it is to protect their reputation and accordingly exclude
companies that are unlikely to succeed, or that have any chance of being fraudulent.
Snowball Effect, for instance, lists only 2% of the hundreds of companies that want
to crowdfund on their site, “mostly because they’re not investment ready.”163 The
platform is selective because, according to the company, “we’ve got our own
reputation [to protect and because] we want investors to get what we think are
interesting opportunities that are ready for public investment.”164 This focus on
158
Crowdfunding Platforms, FINANCIAL MARKETS AUTHORITY, https://www.fma.govt.
nz/compliance/role/crowdfunding-platforms/your-on-going-obligations/ [https://perma.cc/
NR47-VT6L] (last updated July 4, 2019).
159
See Interview with Simeon Burnett, CEO, Snowball Effect, in Auckland, N.Z. (Feb.
27, 2017).
160
See Mackenzie McCarty, Cabinet Gives Green Light to Equity Crowdfunding, N.Z.
Lawyer (Feb. 28, 2014), https://www.nzlawyermagazine.co.nz/news/cabinet-gives-greenlight-to-equity-crowdfunding-184672.aspx [https://perma.cc/3GQX-HMPT] (“It’s . . . really
going to be quite self-fulfilling, because the platform will be incentivized to have the best
companies - they really don’t want any failures on their platforms. And that’s aligning them
absolutely with the interests of investors.”) (quoting Hayley Buckley, a law partner working
alongside the crowdfunding platform, “Snowball Effect”).
161
See id. (discussing the strict licensing process).
162
See Interview with Simeon Burnett, supra note 159 (discussing the rigorous listing
requirements).
163
See Schwartz, Gatekeepers, supra note 18, at 932 n.282 (“98% of companies we
point in another direction.”) (citation omitted); see also John Anthony, New Zealand
Crowdfunding Platforms Gearing Up for Big 2016, STUFF (Jan. 21, 2016, 5:42 PM),
http://www.stuff.co.nz/business/industries/75424341/new-zealand-crowdfunding-platforms
-gearing-up-for-big-2016 [https://perma.cc/75KG-7SVK] (“Snowball Effect had been
approached by hundreds of companies wanting to crowdfund but it was selective about which
were chosen for the platform.”).
164
See Anthony, supra note 163 (“We need to make sure that companies are suitable
for our offering and a lot of companies aren’t.”) (quoting Snowball Effect CEO Simeon
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selectivity, rather than inclusivity, is not unique to Snowball Effect but is rather
standard practice in the industry.165
Second, “syndication” is where the crowd invests alongside a large and
sophisticated “lead” investor. This method comes directly from angel investors.166
Under this model, one “active” or “lead” angel, presumably an expert in the relevant
industry, researches a company and the proposed terms of investment and then
reports back to the rest of the angels in the group.167 The other angels in the group
play a “passive” role; they trust in the expertise and diligence of the lead angel.168
The distinctive legal regime in New Zealand has allowed syndication to
develop as a key method for privately regulating the country’s equity crowdfunding
market. Unlike the United States (as well as practically every other country), New
Zealand’s crowdfunding law imposes no cap on the amount an investor may
contribute.169 This decision was a conscious one on the part of the government. New
Zealand specifically designed this system, at least in part, to facilitate large
investments by lead investors and syndication by the rest of the crowd, just like in
traditional angel investing.170 Hence, under New Zealand law, an angel investor is
legally permitted to invest hundreds of thousands of dollars through a crowdfunding
campaign, making it cost-effective to undertake the burden of acting as a lead
investor.171 The lead investor often makes a very sizable investment herself,
sometimes as much as $500,000 at a time.172 Such an amount would be unlawful
under American law but is perfectly legal in New Zealand.173
Burnett).
165
See Nathan Rose, Equity Crowdfunding Evolutions Expected to Take Place in New
Zealand, #NZENTREPRENEUR (Feb. 22, 2016), https://nzentrepreneur.co.nz/equitycrowdfunding-evolutions-expected-to-take-place-in-new-zealand/ [https://perma.cc/7SA8UVJ8] (“Each equity crowdfunding marketplace [in New Zealand] is ‘curated’ or ‘vetted’ to
some extent.”).
166
See Dale A. Oesterle, Intermediaries in Internet Offerings: The Future Is Here, 50
WAKE FOREST L. REV. 533, 542 (2015) (“The syndicates shadow trade, as coinvestors, on
the trades of ‘lead angels’ or ‘angel advisers.’”).
167
See id. at 542–43 (“[T]he angel takes the lead in identifying the investment
opportunity and negotiating the terms on behalf of their syndicate.”).
168
See id. at 542 (noting that passive investors are given the option to observe and
follow in the angels’ lead).
169
Nathan Rose, How the World Regulates Equity Crowdfunding, REG. REV. (June 26,
2019), https://www.theregreview.org/2019/06/26/rose-how-world-regulates-equity-crowd
funding/ [https://perma.cc/X44B-5GEC].
170
See Interview with James Hartley, Manager, Financial Markets Policy, N.Z.
Ministry of Bus. Innovation & Emp’t, in Auckland, N.Z. (Apr. 4, 2017) (noting the
similarities to angel investing).
171
See Oesterle, supra note 166, at 543 (“The lead angels’ or angel advisers’ economic
incentive to participate is a form of carried interest, a slice of the profits of the syndicate
returns.”).
172
See Interview with Simeon Burnett, supra note 159.
173
15 U.S.C. § 77d(a)(6)(B)(ii) (2012) (establishing $100,000 as the most that any
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In practice, lead investors have become a very important component of New
Zealand’s equity crowdfunding marketplace.174 Like in an angel group, the lead
investor conducts research on the company, and the rest of the crowd comes along
for the ride. Professional investors, including angels and VCs, sometimes play the
role of cornerstone investor.175 They serve to lend credibility to an offer; others take
the fact that someone has bought a large block of shares as a signal that the company
is sound and the valuation is fair.176 Commonly, a lead investor will arrange to
contribute a large sum to a crowdfunding campaign in advance, thus providing it
with momentum from the first day. The experience in New Zealand shows that lead
or cornerstone investors have become an important component of the crowdfunding
marketplace.177
In conclusion, New Zealand’s experience shows that private ordering can serve
as an effective substitute for mandatory disclosure.
V. CONCLUSION
This Article challenges the idea that mandatory disclosure is truly necessary for
primary offerings of securities, as scholars have largely presupposed until now. The
conceptual underpinnings of the modern theory of mandatory disclosure—concern
individual may annually invest in crowdfunding companies). In the United States,
syndication is not a viable model for crowdfunding due to the structure of the securities
crowdfunding law in place there. The JOBS Act places a low legal limit on the total amount
that a person may invest in all crowdfunding companies each year. The upshot is that most
Americans are limited to about $3,000–$5,000 per year or less—and this amount is not per
investment, but rather per year—making it economically infeasible for any one person to
take on the role of lead investor. See 15 U.S.C. § 77d(a)(6)(B)(i) (2012). The investor cap is
simply too low to make it worthwhile for a lead angel to spend the time and effort it takes to
find an appropriate investment and conduct adequate due diligence.
174
See Interview with Simeon Burnett, supra note 159.
175
See Calida Smylie, Equity Crowdfunding Numbers Slump After First Year, NAT’L
BUS. REV. (Nov. 7, 2014) (describing “at least four campaigns [as] being partially led by a
professional investor”); see also Brendan Manning, Riding the New Wave of Equity-Raising,
N.Z. HERALD, (July 23, 2015, 5:00 AM), https://www.nzherald.co.nz/business/news/article
.cfm?c_id=3&objectid=11485195 [https://perma.cc/HF9S-RLLU] (“We’re seeing some
angels and VCs integrating equity crowdfunding as a step in their investment strategy.”)
(quoting Armillary Private Captial director David Wallace).
176
See Shaun Edlin, Pre-arranged Capital and Momentum: Is Real Money Being
Raised Through Online Marketplaces?, SNOWBALL EFFECT (Aug. 24, 2016),
https://www.snowballeffect.co.nz/blog/lessons-weve-learnt-about-momentum [https://perm
a.cc/WMJ9-UDKX] (noting that a lead investor helps validate the offer price); see also
Interview with Simeon Burnett, supra note 159.
177
See Edlin, supra note 176 (“We encourage companies raising through Snowball to
seek a credible investor to lead their offer . . . . To date, only three offers through our
marketplace have failed to reach their minimum investment target . . . the one thing all three
offers had in common was that they lacked a credible lead investor for the round.”); Interview
with Hayley Buckley, Partner, Wynn Williams, in Auckland, N.Z. (May 18, 2017).
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over agency costs and information underproduction—as persuasive as they may be
in the context of secondary markets, hold very little relevance to primary offerings.
This profound insight challenges the very foundations of modern securities law in
the United States and around the world. Furthermore, as a matter of empirical reality,
New Zealand’s equity crowdfunding market represents an example of a successful
public market for primary offerings that operates through private ordering, not
mandatory disclosure.
In light of this argument and evidence, it is no longer tenable to simply say that
public securities markets require mandatory disclosure because of agency costs and
information underproduction. Rather, scholars of securities law should acknowledge
that the modern theory may only apply to secondary markets, not primary ones, and
adjust our conversations about mandatory disclosure accordingly. Going forward,
scholars and policymakers should keep an open mind to the possibility that a primary
securities market open to the public could potentially operate in a socially optimal
way by abandoning mandatory disclosure. Equity crowdfunding in New Zealand is
one example of a privately ordered primary securities market, and others may follow
its lead.

